


Party Organizer



"... the Party must from day to day win the confidence of the proletarian masses; ... by its policy and its activities themselves, secure the support of the masses; ... it must not order but persuade, helping the masses to become aware by their own experience that the Party policy is right; ... it must, therefore, be the guide, the leader, the teacher of the proletariat."—(Stalin, Leninism, Vol. I, p. 38.)

Vol. VIII

FEBRUARY, 1935

No. 2

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CENTRAL COMMITTEE, COMMUNIST PARTY U. S. A

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PARTY ORGANIZER

Vol. VIII

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No. 2

The Campaign Against Hearst and the Dickstein Committee

By F. BROWN

WHILE the McCormack-Dickstein Committee is cooking its report to be served to the House of Representatives, the venomous campaign of the Hearst press against our Party, against the working class, and against the fatherland of the workers of the world, the Soviet Union, is daily increasing with intensified fury.

What is being demanded from the government, by the Hearst press, the Chamber of Commerce and all the arch-reactionary groups, behind whom stands their master, Wall Street? They demand the suppression of the Communist Party, because they know that this will be the best means of checking and hindering the daily struggles of the toiling masses.

While the Hearst press tries to stir up public opinion against our Party on the basis of forged quotations of Communist literature; while it hurls its insults against the proletariat whom it characterizes as a horde of unintelligent people, incapable of ruling, the McCormack-Dickstein Committee is preparing a report, the lies of provocateurs who testified to imaginary plots of our Party inside the Army and Navy, to conspiracies to kidnap the President, etc., with recommendations for the Party's suppression.

The **Daily Worker** has already exposed the Hitler methods used by the Dickstein Committee, which, under the cloak of investigating fascism, directed its fire against Communism, accepting eagerly the testimony of provocateurs, but refusing a hearing to the official representatives of the Communist Party. The fascist methods used by Hitler and Goering in manufacturing testimony against Comrade Dimitroff, and against the heroic Communist Party of Germany, are part of the arsenal of the American investigators of Communism, acting under the flag of the American tradition of "liberty". Mr. Dickstein is the great champion, within the government, of the right-hand man of fascism, William Randolph Hearst.

Today, all over the country, among the organized workers, among the intellectuals and professionals, the indignant

voice of protest is raised against the slanderous campaign of the Hearst press and the professed aims of the McCormack-Dickstein Committee.

Yet, we must ask ourselves: have we aroused real mass indignation; have we reached the largest masses; have we shown concretely that these attacks of Hearst and of the Dickstein Committee are attacks upon the entire working class? Here we have to answer that while we have exposed the maneuvers of Hearst, Dickstein, the Chamber of Commerce, etc., in our press, we have not developed a real campaign among the masses, through which we should have aroused the millions of workers, who are insulted and attacked by the Hearst press. We have not rallied these millions to the support of their Party, our Party, the vanguard of the American working class.

It is our task to conduct the most vigorous campaign against all attacks against our Party, to mobilize the large masses of workers, to put a stop to the attacks of the Hearst fascist press and its allies—the Chamber of Commerce, the reactionary leaders of the American Legion, the National Civic Federation, the Matthew Wolls, the counter-revolutionary Daughters of the American Revolution and their instrument, the McCormack-Dickstein Investigating Committee who, under the banner of American “democracy”, are raising high the swastika.

How Shall We Combat This Campaign?

It is our task:

1. To intensify the campaign of exposure in the whole Party press, which means not only in the **Daily Worker**, and the other daily and weekly papers, but in every shop and neighborhood paper issued by the Communist Party units, in all bulletins and in special leaflets.

2. The whole agitational apparatus of the Party must be utilized to counteract, with mass distribution of leaflets, the slanders of the Hearst press, to expose the methods of investigation of the McCormack-Dickstein Committee. Millions of leaflets must be issued by the Districts, sections and units. Every mimeograph, every typewriter at our disposal and at the disposal of the mass organizations around the Party must be mobilized in this campaign for the issuing of leaflets along the line of the editorials in the **Daily Worker**. The Hearst press reaches millions. We must also reach millions. Through this campaign we must show our ability to reach the masses in the shops, in the trade unions, in the mass organizations, in the neighborhoods and in the countryside. We can reach these millions if we will mobilize all our forces. We can effectively counteract the venomous

attacks of the fascist Hearst press, and not only teach the workers about the Communist Party, but mobilize them for its defense.

3. No day shall pass without exposing the forgeries of the Hearst press and its insults against the working class, by plastering the walls of factories, the neighborhoods, meeting halls of workers, etc., with stickers, which bring to the masses our position.

4. In cities where the Hearst press is instrumental in leading the attack upon the working class institutions (the attacks upon the Workers School in Chicago), the Party fractions in the trade unions and in all mass organizations should become the driving force for the mobilization of these organizations to express their indignation by sending mass delegations to the Hearst press. We should also mobilize professionals, intellectuals and liberals for these delegations, by pointing out to them that the attack is also against them.

5. There should not be a local of a trade union, or branch of a mass organization where there are Communists, or sympathetic workers, that remains passive in this campaign. We must reach hundreds of thousands of local organizations which will respond enthusiastically to our appeals to flood the House of Representatives with protests against the report of the Dickstein Committee.

Strengthen the United Front

This campaign against the suppression of the Communist Party must be utilized everywhere for the broadening of the united front. Every unit of the Party, every fraction, must be orientated towards strengthening its efforts to build a united front with the workers in the factories, in the neighborhoods and in the mass organizations. We must renew our direct approach to the Socialist Party locals as well as to the trade unions and all other mass organizations. Through the pressure of the rank and file of the Socialist Party, Norman Thomas and the Socialist Party leadership must be forced to make their position clear on this campaign.

We must also demand of William Green and the various officials of the A. F. of L. to explain clearly before the masses that if they are really opposed to additional legislation against the Communist Party, as Wm. Green appeared to indicate at the hearings of the Dickstein Committee, why does he and the officers of the A. F. of L. continue their incitements against the Communist Party? Why does he remain silent at the vicious attacks of Matthew Woll, tool of the monopolists, against the labor movement? Why do not he and his lieutenants call upon the unions to fight against the projects of the Dickstein Committee?

We must act without delay! We must act with the same energy with which we conducted the campaign against the Hitler frame-up of the Reichstag trial. While conducting this campaign, while mobilizing the widest masses, we must understand that our main task is the building of the Party, since through the strengthening of the Party in the shops, in the A. F. of L. and other mass organizations, we will strengthen our connection with the widest masses, we will create the best guarantee to withstand all attacks against our Party.

An Example of Check-Up

By I. K.

WEST Phila Section No. 3 issued a challenge to Section No. 6, in the Recruiting drive. The challenge included the following.

1. Reduction in fluctuation; 2. Daily Worker Drive.

These tasks to be fulfilled by the Lenin Memorial meeting, Jan. 18th.

The Section Committee met the day following the Lenin Memorial meeting to discuss our accomplishments as well as the tasks that were not fulfilled. As a result of our discussion at the Section Committee, we decided to send a report to the **Daily Worker**. We ask that Section No. 6 do likewise. The report is as follows:—

1. We had a 98 % registration.
2. Ten members were brought back to the Party.
3. We recruited 85 % of the quota assigned to us by the district. This was done by each unit issuing leaflets and calling meetings on the problems confronting the workers; by calling open fraction meetings and open unit meetings once a month. All Daily Worker readers and financial supporters were called to such meetings.
4. One new unit was established near our Factory concentration point, which will enable us to do more effective work around the factory.
5. The dues payments were as high as 150 % in the last two weeks of Dec., and the first week in Jan. due to the fact that all members who were behind in dues were paying up in order to register and receive new books. We have a comrade in charge of dues and the amount they sell in their units.
6. Two YCL units were organized with a little help from the party, and we are convinced that by assigning a leading

comrade to guide the YCL and show them how to work, we will be able to build a mass youth movement in our section.

7. Steps were taken to raise the political and ideological level of our comrades by:

a. Opening a bookshop in which we sold, within the last nine weeks, \$175.00 worth of literature, as against \$12.00 worth in the two months previous to the opening the bookshop.

b. By organizing a weekly study circle in the bookshop.

c. By making the comrades conscious of the importance of reading and selling literature and the **Daily Worker**.

d. By increasing the sales of the **Imprecorr**, from 4 to 17 copies; the **C.I.** from 10 to 20 copies; **The Communist** from 25 to 40 copies; the **Party Organizer** from 35 to 56 copies.

e. By organizing weekly discussions in the units.

However, we have only made a beginning in establishing a literature and agit-prop department in our section, and one of our main tasks now, will be the strengthening of this department.

8. In the **Daily Worker Drive**, although the District Drive started with the Lenin Memorial, we have already increased our route from 70 to 85, and our bundle order from 1,125 to 1,300, weekly.

9. All our campaigns were linked up with the Lenin Memorial Meeting, such as Red Sundays, canvassing with **Daily Worker**, mass meetings, etc. In this way we helped make the Lenin Memorial meeting a success.

The tasks which were not fulfilled were discussed and the following decisions arrived at:

1. That within the next month functioning fractions be established in these organizations, where we have failed to establish them during the recent drive. The Section Buro is responsible for this.

2. A check up is to be made immediately of all members eligible for trade unions; these comrades to join their respective trade unions within one month.

We urge Section No. 6. to send in a report on their drive and within 12 hours of receiving this report, we promise to send them the **Snail**.

Copies of this report to be sent to all units in both section, to the District and to the **Daily Worker**.

Report of Work on the ——— Railroad

Objective Conditions

I WILL deal mainly with the question of our trade union policy, where and to what degree we have made progress and whether we must modify our tactics to achieve our main objective.

In the month of March 1934 we set up a shop unit of eight for the ——— R.R. Only two of the eight were active in trade union work. The remaining comrades were not politically developed and could not see the necessity of working within the trade union movement.

As an active member in the A. F. of L., my time was occupied in field organizing and in our local International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. At that time the ——— R.R. was unorganized and up to the time the vote was taken on the R.R., which resulted in the A. F. of L. getting the majority, another comrade and I had to do a considerable amount of spade work. During this period I was not working on this railroad, but on July 3 I succeeded in finding employment in the ——— Shops and so became a part of the working force.

Laid the Basis for Organization

With the help of two more comrades in the shop we began to lay the basis for a shop unit.

First we had to build a group in this shop. This was done on the basis of organization since, when the workers accepted the jurisdiction of the federated shop crafts we were free to organize.

At each seniority point grievance committees were now set up. Another comrade and myself were elected on the grievance committees.

Shop Bulletin

In September we put out our first Party **Bulletin**, which was very effective in exposing the use of poisonous gasoline containing lead for cleaning purposes. Through one of our group, giving us information about the safety committee, we were able to brand them as efficiency experts for the company and this took well with the men. Two of our group wrote for the **Bulletin** and also gave us money to help pay expenses.

As a result of this first **Bulletin** a special meeting was called of all Safety Committees in the ——— shop where instructions were given to stop the use of this gas for cleaning purposes immediately, which was done.

By this time we had a group of eight, and were working in direct contact with the unity movement.

Broke Down Isolation

In all the years in which I was a member of our local union I used to take the floor and try to have motions passed, but I could never get a seconder. I began to analyze the reason for this and decided that I was making the wrong approach to the workers. I therefore decided to work with them. Today I have 50 per cent of the membership with me, another comrade and myself have been elected to the Executive Board of our local, two from our shop unit and four of our group have been elected to our local federation, which comprises committees from the various seniority points in Chicago.

Although we succeeded in our first **Bulletin** in winning certain concessions for the workers, we learned a lesson. This was, that there is no use in waving a red flag in front of a bull! As a result of broadcasting our Party material in streaming headlines on the first page of the September **Bulletin**, hundreds of these **Bulletins** were lying on the ground.

Therefore, we decided to put shop news on the first page of the second **Bulletin** with the result that only a few were thrown away by the workers.

One of our Party members is chairman of the grievance committee in ——— Yards of the R.R. The management decided to get rid of him and at the same time strike a blow at the union. It framed him on a technical charge of making an error in measurement and fired him.

The case dragged on for two weeks. Finally the local federation, of which we were both members, took drastic action and brought pressure to bear on our international officers.

We pointed out to our system federation that should the company be successful in firing our elected grievance man, this would have a very bad effect on the standing of our union; that this was a test case and if successful for the company no union official would be safe and everything we had built up would be at stake. Also the company had not as yet signed our agreement.

Our international officers got into action and our comrade was put back on the job. This was a great victory for our leadership and prestige among the men.

Strategy in the Reactionary Unions

The road in the reactionary unions is very rocky and our strategy and tactics will have to change from time to time,

but it is our task to entrench ourselves in the key positions in the union.

Our task would be easier if we had the assistance of a shop concentration unit. At present we are training Party forces in our section in trade union problems so that they will be in a position to help us.

Also because of the few forces no connections have as yet been established with the transportation departments in the railroad. This we will try to overcome, so that when a real attack is made by the road, we will be able to resist with united action.

In spite of mistakes I am convinced that we have made progress and will continue to do so. As Comrade Lenin said: "Do not work with groups that are convinced, but go with the groups that are wrong and work with them even if they are wrong and when the psychological moment presents itself we are with them to show them their mistakes. In this way we assume leadership."

Generals are of no use without an army and we will work with the army, bringing the message of the class struggle before them. In the shops it is our duty as Communists to stay on the job and not to expose ourselves. Recognizing the fact that the bosses are organized and have their men in key positions ready to upset any plans we may make, we will have to work very carefully.

"The Party possesses all the necessary qualifications. It is the rallying point for the best elements of the working class, elements which are intimately connected with the non-Party organizations of the proletariat and are very often the leading spirit in these organizations. As rallying point for these elements of the working class, it is the best school for the training of leaders who shall be capable of guiding all the forms of organization thrown up in the course of the working class struggle. Further, the Party, as the best school for the training of leaders, and the most experienced and authoritative of working class organizations, is specially fitted for the work of centralizing the leadership of the proletarian struggle and for converting each and every non-Party organization of the working class into an auxiliary corps and into a means for linking up the working class as a whole with the Party. The Party is the highest form of class organization of the proletariat."—Stalin, Leninism, page 168.

For More and Better Coordination and Simplification of Our Campaigns

A REPLY TO A QUESTION

By **BILL LAWRENCE**, Org., Section 10, N. Y.

IN THE January issue of the **Party Organizer**, Comrade Brandt poses the question: "Too many campaigns, or not enough Communists—which is correct?" The very placing of the questions and some of the points raised, seem to us to be wrong. We also beg to differ with Comrade Brandt on some of his conclusions, particularly his reasons for retreat in the marine strike.

While it is correct to treat the Party campaigns as an integral part of our daily Party work closely linked up with the general and specific problems of the workers, the success and our participation in those campaigns, however, are not determined exclusively by numbers of Party members, but rather by our ability to bring the campaigns to the workers in such concrete forms that the workers will understand them and be willing to fight with us for the realization of the Party demands in a given campaign.

Said Comrade Brandt:

"Why didn't we carry out the above and many more campaigns? . . . We didn't do it because we haven't enough 'man power'. Not enough Communists, not enough Red organizers among the unemployed and part-time workers, not enough Red organizers in the factories . . . not enough Red organizers in the trade union movement. This is the basic and most outstanding weakness of our Party."

To prove his statement, Brandt proceeds to quote Comrade Browder on the textile situation.

No one can overemphasize the importance of more and **better** organizers in all phases of Party activity but to place the emphasis for the failure of certain campaigns on numbers, would lead to the tendency to treat a given campaign as something separate and apart from the general work of the Party and leave the impression that—well, we have so many campaigns, and so many comrades. We will divide all campaigns equally among the comrades and the reason we didn't carry out all campaigns is, "because we haven't enough man power."

Communist Party Judged By Its Quality

A Communist Party, Comrade Brandt, is judged not only quantitatively but also, and especially, qualitatively. Num-

bers, just numbers, is not enough. A good Party understanding, methods of work, ability to apply the correct Party line in practice and taking advantage of issues to introduce the Party campaigns which flow from the issues and problems of the working class—are important elements to be considered.

An example—assuming at a meeting of Section Organizers the District brings forth three important campaigns: (a) Daily Worker, (b) Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance, (c) West Coast strike.

Of course, with more shop nuclei, with more members, we can reach wider sections of the working class with those three important campaigns. We cannot say, however, upon checking up by the District that we failed, say in the **Daily Worker Drive** because of lack of “man power”. Forces—sure, that is important. But when we fail in a certain campaign, it is not because of lack of forces, but rather because of:

a. Our own underestimation of the importance of the given campaign.

b. Inability to link it up with the other campaigns of the Party at the given time.

c. Stressing the difficulties and following the road of least resistance.

d. Adopting the attitude of “Well, I will do what I can”, not realizing that such an attitude on our part, as Section Organizers, must inevitably reflect itself in the directives we give to the units.

To say that we were forced to make an organized retreat in the recent marine strike because “there were not enough Communist seamen on the ships and on the beach”, or that the longshoremen failed to rally in sympathy strikes because “there are very few Communist longshoremen on the docks”, is not only making the problem too simple, Comrade Brandt, but drawing wrong conclusions as well. What about the objective forces, Comrade Brandt, as, for example:

1. The combined forces of the state, employers and bureaucracy?

2. The vicious terror and intimidation against the workers.

3. The insufficient support from other ports.

4. Not strong and effective enough opposition groups in the I.L.A.

How about some of our methods of work on the river front prior to the strike!

Recruiting—highly important. More Red organizers—too valuable to underestimate them. But to blame the failure of carrying out certain campaigns on “lack of numbers in our ranks” or to place the effective coordination, unity and organization of our campaigns as a secondary problem is wrong—to say the least.

Our weakness so far lies precisely in our insufficient knowledge of how to coordinate, unify and simplify all campaigns of the Party in such a way that not only will our comrades in the units look upon those campaigns as part and parcel of the general class struggles in America, but that they will also be accepted as such by the broad masses of workers.

Recruiting will only solve the problem partially. We must also take the necessary steps to make sure that our recruits remain in the Party. We must train new cadres and leaders for the workers' struggles. We must be more and more part of the workers. We must be more alert to the problems of the workers and, above everything, we must learn better methods of work and how to simplify a general slogan of the Party in such a way that American workers will see and realize that by fighting for the realization of that general Party slogan, he is actually fighting for his own betterment of conditions.

If we learn these things and I am certain that we learn more of them every day, we will improve the work of the Party and build the Party to a far greater extent than we do at present.

* * * *

Editorial Note:—The points brought out in Comrade Lawrence's article are well taken. However, we think he misunderstood the import of Comrade Brandt's article in the last issue of the **Party Organizer**, which was a plea for recruiting. However, it is well to point out the wrong conclusion which can be drawn from that article. Certainly it is wrong to place the question as if the main obstacle to carrying out the campaigns of the Party is the insufficient number of Party members. Recruiting is a task which flows out of every campaign of the Party, however, recruiting cannot be carried on without struggle, without carrying out the campaigns of the Party which are centered around the burning issues of the workers.

The proper utilization of our present forces, the proper and planned distribution of work, the ability to concretely link up various campaigns and base them on the day-to-day mass work of the Party—this is the key to the solution of the problem caused by the gap between our numerous tasks and lack of sufficient forces. This is the key to mass recruiting. Immediate attention to recruiting will certainly help solve this main political question.

How Can We Secure the Use of the Radio?

By F. BROWN

THE ruling class has at its disposal tremendous facilities which it uses to divert the working masses from the issues of the class struggle, to blind them to the growing menace of fascism, and to poison their minds with vicious lies against the workers' fatherland, the Soviet Union, and against the revolutionary vanguard of the working class—the Communist Party. At this moment, when the ruling class, supported and assisted by the Roosevelt government, is making its sharpest attack upon the working class, when the munitions manufacturers and the Roosevelt government are engaged in the greatest war preparations of history, the whole apparatus of press, church, school, movies and radio are being utilized to throw out a barrage of poisonous propaganda to confuse, mislead and blind the workers.

Among the most important of the instruments of propaganda are the movies and the radio. We are all familiar with the broadcasts of Father Coughlin. But we are not always aware of the many little "Father Coughlins" who broadcast their insidious poison many times a day. They are the announcers on every radio station, who inform us of the news and "interpret" the weekly events, along the line laid down by the ruling class and its government. For example, the spokesman of the Hearst press is on the air several times each day, bringing the fascist poison of Hearst to the masses.

It is a rare occasion when a true labor speaker, bringing forward the point of view of the proletariat, of the working class press, has an opportunity of reaching the broad masses who compose the radio audience, the majority of whom are workers and farmers. Today, the radio is an instrument exclusively for the propaganda of the ruling class. Its rates are prohibitive for working class organizations. Proletarian culture is kept off the air by the simple expedient of making the air costly. In this situation it becomes difficult through the written word alone—through our daily press, bulletins, leaflets, etc., to counteract the propaganda of our enemies, who have such a tremendous apparatus at their disposal.

However, from the inception of the class struggle, the proletariat has found ways and means of using all the technical achievements of society for the purpose of spreading its own revolutionary propaganda. In this period of the movies, radio, etc., we must strive to make these also ours. Certain achievements have already been attained in the field

of motion pictures. But the prohibitive expense of the radio has until now closed the radio to us. This problem too can and must be solved by the revolutionary working class.

The most powerful weapon in the hands of the workers—mass pressure—can open to us this medium of propaganda. Mass pressure can compel the radio companies to take into consideration the wishes of the radio audience. The comrades in California and other places have given us an excellent example. The **Western Worker** announced that Lawrence Ross, co-editor of the **Western Worker**, will broadcast every Wednesday night, over Station KTAB, a resume of important world events. This broadcast is being sponsored by the Workers School of San Francisco.

We do not know how the Workers School of San Francisco succeeded in making arrangements for these broadcasts, how much they pay for them, or whether they are free of charge. However, knowing the resources of the Workers School, it is clear that the charge cannot be prohibitive. It is also evident that the demand of the radio audience in San Francisco must have compelled the granting of time on the air for these weekly broadcasts of a Marxian analysis of important world affairs.

We are convinced that if the comrades in San Francisco could succeed in utilizing the radio, similar success could be achieved in hundreds of American cities. The problem is to mobilize the radio audiences, who are composed in the large majority of the toiling masses, to demand that radio, which is the technical achievement of the twentieth century, cease to be the exclusive property of the advertising companies, the industrialists, Wall Street and their mouthpieces, and be placed also at the disposal of the masses.

It is clear that if one of the outstanding leaders of our Party could have the opportunity to utilize the national radio hook-ups, there would be millions of requests that more time be provided for our speakers.

The policy of the Radio Commission is to keep the radio exclusively at the disposal of the ruling class. We must take up the challenge. In all the important cities of America a real campaign should be developed, flooding the radio stations, on a local, state and national scale, demanding lower rates, demanding the opportunity for representatives of the working class, and its vanguard, the Communist Party, to utilize the radio. The example of California and other cities shows us the possibilities. Why not start such a campaign immediately?

The Recruiting Drive in the Columbus Section

By H. POLLACK, Section Org., Columbus Sec.

WHAT are some of the lessons we can learn from the present recruiting drive in this section?

1. After discussing the letter of the Central Committee on recruiting we found that the older Party members—those who have been in the Party a year or more—were so isolated from the workers that it was impossible for them to give the names of two or three workers who could be recruited. Their contacts have been with the same people, limited to the unit or the Unemployment Council local. They regard the Party as their own personal possession. This is reflected in their attitude to new members, whom they regard as intruders disturbing the peaceful family circle at unit meetings.

2. The recruiting is not conducted by the Party as a whole, but by individual members of the Section Committee, the field representative of the National Unemployment Council, and new Party members. For instance, a new Party member in Unit 3 has recruited members for Units 5, 2, and 1, where the comrades claim “no one is ready for the Party”.

3. These new members are helping the Party break through its isolation in this section. Through these new members we have now some contacts in the A. F. of L. and the Ohio Unemployed League. When the boot and shoe strike was taking place in Columbus, it was a new Party member who made contacts for us to have the floor at the strike meeting. A new Party member in Muskingum County was the driving force in getting the Unemployed League to endorse the National Congress for Unemployment Insurance and send delegates.

4. The recruiting of basic proletarian elements will solve the question of forces. For example, among our new Party members we have an unemployed printer who is now editing the **Hunger Fighter**; a militant member of the U.M.W.A., a former railroad worker who is now making contacts for the Railroad unity movement; a member of the A. F. of L. through whose influence the Workers' Bill, H.R. 2827, was recently endorsed in his local.

5. Our comrades too often regard recruiting as something removed from daily experience. The recruiting of workers can and should be carried on among those workers with whom we are in contact. A Negro comrade in Unit 3 was

able to recruit three American white workers from his relief job by talking to them and giving them Party literature to read.

New Members Must Be Activized

Bringing workers into the Party is only one phase of our recruiting drive. The main problem is to keep these workers in the Party—activize them. We have already noticed the dangerous tendency of the units not to follow up these new members and visit them whenever they fail to attend meetings. We also are finding it necessary to set up new units for the recent recruits, as the inner life of the old units discourages new members. We find new members staying away from unit meetings because the meetings are boring.

Party education is the surest guarantee of keeping these new members. Those workers who come into the Party after engaging in conversation and discussion, after reading our literature, prove to be the most stable and reliable elements. This method of recruiting is always more difficult than the usual method of having the worker sign up for the Party at an enthusiastic meeting. Those workers who sign up for the Party in a moment of enthusiasm are the ones easily discouraged and drop out.

The stabilization of the new members depends upon our giving these new members an understanding of the principles and organizational structure of the Party. The study class set up for this purpose does not involve enough of the new members. They do not as yet feel that the attendance of the study class is their first assignment in the Party. We also have the serious task of combatting the newer forms of demagoguery. One of our new members has dropped out of the Party to join Father Coughlin's National Union for Social Justice.

Another weakness in our section is the insufficient amount of recruiting conducted among Negro, women, and youth workers. Although we have some influence among the Negro workers, we find that a very small number of Negro workers have been brought into the Party. We could have more women in the Party, if the men comrades did not adopt the attitude that the Party is not for women. While some youth have been recruited and the general age-level of the new Party members has been favorable, our Party as a whole is not consciously recruiting the youth.

Every Party member must learn that the signing of the application card and receiving the initiation fees do not complete the recruitment. No worker can really be considered as recruited until he becomes activized. It becomes the responsibility of every unit to have the new members attend unit meetings and the study class regularly. Acquainting

these workers with the organizational methods and problems of the Party is the first step in activizing these new members after joining. To bring a worker into the Party, and then to fail to activize him, is as great a crime, if not greater, than not bringing him into the Party at all.

These suggestions appear so simple and apparent, yet they are decisive in determining the outcome of the recruiting drive in our Section.

* * * *

Editorial Note:—While the above article correctly stresses the necessity of recruiting from our contacts in the shops, among the unemployed, and of bringing the workers in the basic industries into the Party, and also lays emphasis upon more work among the Negroes, women and youth, yet the inference can be drawn that only the “new members” who came into the Party within the last year are good. It may be that the Party Section in Columbus has a greater proportion of “old” members, who think that their obligation to the Party ends with their possession of a membership card and the payment of dues, than other sections, but we are inclined to doubt this. Old members have a great deal to contribute to the Party in the very fact of their familiarity with the Party, what it stands for, how it works, etc. True, these old members must not be permitted to be inactive members. We should conduct our ideological campaign not only among the new members, but among the old ones also, explaining to them that inactivity in recruiting, and in all the campaigns of the Party is inconsistent with Party membership.

Perhaps if the section would examine the situation it would discover why the “old members” are “no good” and the new ones enthusiastic and active. Is it because in the past the Party in Columbus was not a Party of struggle, and as a result the old members got a wrong idea of Party activity, whereas the new members who are brought in during the struggle joined the Party because they saw it leading struggles, and for this reason desired to be members of such a Party?

The article correctly stresses the necessity of breaking the isolation of the Party from the masses. These new, militant elements will assist the Party in this task. Their good example should also be used, together with an ideological campaign, to turn the inactive old Party members into real Communists, who not only understand the Party program, but who actively work to carry it out. In this connection, we refer the Columbus Section to the article in this issue of the **Party Organizer**, “Some Experiences in Activizing a Street Unit”, which relates how this problem was successfully solved in a Cleveland unit.

Some Experiences in Activizing a Street Unit

By M. T. MARTIN

Agit-Prop Director, Unit 343, Dist. 6

8 Months Ago

ABOUT eight months ago three fairly well developed comrades were sent in to strengthen Unit 3. It was the weakest unit in the section; the weakest in many sections.

We found that the only thing that kept the unit together was the fact that the comrades felt that the Communist Party was the party to belong to, and they each had a membership book which certified that they had a right to attend the unit meetings. Unit meetings are held in private homes and can be attended only by Party members. The comrades realized it was a privilege to attend these, more or less secret, meetings.

The meetings were scheduled to start at 8:30 p.m. It was usually about 9 o'clock before they would actually get started. In order to make sure the comrades would stay to the end, and to make the meetings more enjoyable, tea and cake were served after the meetings. Everybody was asked to chip in 5 cents for this, as a means of raising money for the unit.

There was a unit bureau which met irregularly; it depended entirely on the section letter for its work. Its work was comprised of telling the unit what was contained in the section letter.

The entire membership, with one or two exceptions, was potentially a good membership. The basic shortcomings were: **they didn't know what to do; they didn't know the function of a unit.** We must add, however, that the unit sold about 50 **Daily Workers** each Saturday. Three comrades were responsible for this.

It was therefore necessary to explain that the Communist Party was the most advanced, most intelligent, most heroic section of the working class. It was necessary to explain that Communists must give leadership to the rest of our fellow workers in our every-day struggles, and at the same time link the immediate struggle with the question of Soviet Power. It was necessary to explain that the unit was **the Communist Party** in our neighborhood; that in order to give this leadership it was imperative that we, as a unit, as well as every individual member, had to equip ourselves for this task; that we had to read and study our Marxist-Leninist literature; that, however, we should not

postpone our activities until we all got through studying, since we had a great deal to learn in the process of the struggle.

What Was Done?

The reorganization of the unit bureau was our first task. Two of the more developed comrades were placed on the unit bureau.

We changed the time of meeting from 8:30 to 8 sharp, and insisted on prompt attendance. At the same time we insisted that we expected the unit bureau to meet at 7 p.m. and to be through promptly at 8. Later on we found it necessary to start the unit bureau meetings at 6:30, since we found we could not get through by 8 o'clock. We realized that if we expected the whole unit to come on time, we should set the example and finish our bureau meeting on time.

We then eliminated the after-meeting tea and cake, which was a nuisance for the comrades' wives at whose homes we met, and eliminated the 5-cent toll which was paid by the comrades for this treat.

We immediately inaugurated systematic political discussions. To be sure that these would not be eliminated because there was not enough time left towards the end of the meeting, we placed political discussion as the very first thing on the agenda of every unit meeting, for one full hour. Our first few discussions were held on the meaning of the Communist Party, its relationship to the C. I., general Party structure, Districts, sections, the division of Section 3 into so many street units of which we were one; that at this time there were about 50 such unit meetings throughout Cleveland; about 200 throughout the district, etc. The meaning of fractions and finally, the specific functions of our street unit.

The comrades were interested; we had shown them that they really had some important work to do in our neighborhood; they had a specific function; they realized now that we were the Communist Party, that we had a territory which was ours to work in; that when the revolutionary period approached, we were responsible for leading the masses in our neighborhood in establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. The comrades didn't miss their tea and cake.

Summer approached. With few exceptions, we carried on weekly open-air meetings.

Our literature agent was slovenly in his work; missed several meetings; was many weeks in arrears in his dues payments. We called him to the unit bureau; he agreed to pay up within a certain number of weeks; we turned literature work over to another comrade. We then reported to the

whole unit on the loose work of this comrade, and of his pledge to take a more active interest in the unit's work. We explained that looseness of this nature is not the stuff that successful revolutionaries are made of. We explained that such looseness suffered under Hitler Germany might cost the lives of many workers.

Then came the bread strike. It was conducted by the Council of Jewish Working Women. Our unit thoroughly discussed the strike at every meeting as long as the strike lasted, and even a few meetings after the strike, to draw our lessons. We linked up our local struggle to lower the price of bread with the New Deal A.A.A. program, in which Roosevelt pays the capitalists to allow thousands of wheat acres to lie fallow, charging \$1.50 processing tax per barrel of flour, making us workers pay for it. Our unit was the only one in our territory to issue a leaflet bringing forth the Party as an important factor in this strike; coming out with a slogan to cut the price of bread without cutting the wages of the bakery workers; at the expense of the bakery bosses. Not even the section issued a leaflet. Towards the end of the strike, the Y.C.L. unit issued a leaflet. We carried on many open air meetings urging the neighbors to help picket and otherwise assist in winning the strike.

We took an active part in two evictions in our neighborhood. In one of them our unit took a leading part with the able assistance of one of the candidates. As a result of the enthusiasm he had aroused and when he asked "What are you going to do about it?" the crowd suddenly seized the furniture to put it in another home. After the furniture had been replaced, and the lights turned on, we conducted another meeting in front of the new house and indicated that the Unemployment Council, the Y.C.L. and the Communist Party in this neighborhood, Unit 343, had taken the initiative in putting this worker back in a home. We explained the capitalist way out and the workers' way out of the crisis. This took place during the election campaign. It had its effect in votes.

Shortly after the last District Convention, our unit drew up a plan of work as follows:

1. To raise our quota in the Daily Worker Financial Drive: Our quota as given by the section was \$40. We immediately raised it to \$50. We challenged any other unit in our section to be the first to achieve its quota. Our challenge was taken up by unit 346 who also raised their quota to \$50. In this respect our unit was helping to activize another unit. This socialist competition was further aided by the section submitting a weekly bulletin to each unit in the section, showing the standings of all other units. The result was that our unit was the first to go over the top in the

district with over \$60. Our competing unit was second with \$51. Our section likewise was the first to go over the top in the district and in the country, as recorded in the **Daily Worker**.

2. To Build an Unemployment Council in our Unit Territory: This was a task in which our former literature agent, who had been called to the unit bureau, was very much interested. He was assigned to the work of organizing a council on E. 117th St. The comrade went into it wholeheartedly. The council now is fairly well established and has gained a definite amount of prestige in the neighborhood. This council, under the guidance of our unit, tackles the serious task of fighting for relief. Tuesdays are taken up with cases, and Thursday evenings are devoted to educational work. Speakers of the Party address this forum on various phases of the labor movement.

3. To Start the Regular Publication of a Unit Bulletin: 4 issues (1,000 copies each) have already appeared, one each month. Issue number 2, however, due to the criminal neglect of one comrade, appeared only in limited edition (21 copies). This comrade was severely criticized by the unit bureau, and thoroughly exposed before the whole unit membership. From then on our bulletin was edited, stenciled, mimeographed, assembled and distributed with almost military precision, definite assignments having been made beforehand, and all being carried out with a few minor slip-ups. The bulletin is priced at 2 cents. It is given away to every family in the neighborhood with a request for a contribution. In this way the cost of the bulletin is covered by our neighbors. Some give us a quarter, others a nickel or a few pennies; some throw us out of the house; nevertheless, everybody gets a copy. Although each successive issue of the bulletin is better than the previous one, it still has the basic weakness of not being a neighborhood bulletin in the full sense of the word, since most of material is applicable to almost any other part of the city of Cleveland. Although we popularize the local class struggle organizations in our territory, the workers in our neighborhood do not yet send us letters about their complaints; they don't yet look upon our **Nabor Worker** as their weapon. With the further technical improvement of our paper, making it more readable, we look forward to great possibilities.

4. To Build a Y.C.L. Unit in our Territory: With the help of some of the comrades of the League unit on upper Kinsman, we succeeded in convincing the Y.C.L. to split this unit of about 25 members, giving our territory the beginning of a class struggle youth movement. The circulation of the **Young Worker** through the League units readily increased from 75 to 100. Our Party unit expects to start

with five copies of the **Young Worker**, beginning with the next issue. A much closer cooperation between the Party and League units is still to be effected. Only one meeting was held with our unit bureau and the new League unit organizer.

5. To Acquire a Mimeograph by Lenin Memorial Day: This has also been achieved. Our bulletin is now published on our own machine.

6. To Get Five New Members by Lenin Memorial Day: Our Unit has recruited about 10; some of them in other territories.

7. To Sell a Daily Bundle of the Daily Worker: We have made two attempts of one week each at two different methods. First, to have a different comrade each day cover the same concentration street; second, to have one comrade leave sample copies for about three days in the same homes and then try to sell the next copy. The first failed because the various comrades had different meetings of mass organizations to attend, got odd jobs, or got mixed up as to where to get the **Daily Workers**. Sometimes the **Daily Worker** deliveries failed, helping further to upset the schedules. The second method failed perhaps because the comrade was not consistent or did not make the right approach. We have yet to fulfill this task. We have, however, increased our Saturday bundle from 50 to 100. Of any special issue, we take 200 copies. For a Red Sunday, not a single comrade is excused, regardless of whether he is a section functionary, District functionary, what not. It is as a result of these leading comrades going out house to house with the other comrades, that we get the major part of the unit doing most important work of making personal contact with the workers in our neighborhood, and talking to them in our effort to make them buy our **Daily Worker**, **Nabor Worker** or other literature; thus bringing the Party program to them.

8. To Get Five Subs for the Daily Worker: In this we have so far failed miserably. We will however accomplish this during the current new sub drive.

Some More Results

Of a membership of 19, 16 buy **Party Organizers**. 8 the **C. I. Magazine**. 4 **Communists**. Our unit has sold 4 **Lenin Sets**, and decided to get at least one more sold. We have established a literature fund of \$2 from the unit treasury. Our unit territory polled more votes in the last election than any other. Our section polled more than any other. Unit votes polled 228. Section votes polled 870. Literature sales amount to about five dollars a month. We must do better than this.

The unit has taken on new life; particularly around the issuance of the **Nabor Worker**, the first in the district. Already we have heard of two other units working on a street unit bulletin—Unit 346 and a unit in another section.

We now have 19 members and are considering splitting our unit in two. We still have many shortcomings, but are nevertheless well on the way to becoming a really Bolshevik Party cell, one that will be able, if necessary, to function independently under all circumstances.

Our principal shortcoming has been our gross neglect of shop concentration work. There are a few medium sized shops in our territory, but far removed from where any of our comrades live. This distance must not be an excuse for a Bolshevik unit. The only evidence of shop work we carried on was pasting leaflets and painting signs in this shop territory announcing demonstrations and the election campaign.

One of our major tasks now is to help our adjoining unit to concentrate on ———. There is a shop unit already in existence there, though not through our efforts.

How a New York Hospital Nucleus Was Organized and Built

By Unit Org., N. Y.

ABOUT 10 months ago, among the workers in our hospital, there were three Party members, one Y.C.Ler and one very active I.L.D. member. After a little contact work, the I.L.D. member was recruited into the Party. Having five members already, we took up the question with the Section of organizing a nucleus in spite of opposition among some of our own comrades. But the section was not encouraging either. Its leading functionaries were in doubt whether shop nuclei should be organized in plants like hospitals, which do not belong to the basic industries. They did not realize that in hospitals, too, the workers are bitterly exploited and are discontented and, therefore, there is a place for organization.

But we were stubborn and a unit of five was finally formed. For two or three meetings, the Section Rep. met with us but then was taken away for street unit work (in our section, at that time, such work was considered more important). Lacking cooperation from the Section, and having no former experience in shop work, we had to grope and guess how to go about organizing the nucleus. We were constantly contacting workers and spreading our weapons

of propaganda and organization throughout the hospital. Our literature became a familiar sight in the place. In a short time we obtained 15 **Daily Worker** readers, about 10 readers of **Ny Tid**, 10 subscribers to the **New Masses** and gained three new members into the unit.

This persistent work brought results not only from within the hospital but also made the Section Committee realize the importance of working within such plants as ours. The Section Rep. sent to us was capable; he was constantly planning for us, but, being busy with many other activities, he never had the time actually to show us how to carry on our work.

Meanwhile, a struggle for the reinstatement of two dismissed nurses developed. The campaign for reinstatement conducted by the Nurses and Hospital Workers League was done with the cooperation and guidance of the nucleus. Leaflets exposing the administration and their exploitation and discrimination against their employees were issued both by the League and the nucleus to the workers inside, and the neighborhood outside. The campaign was gaining tempo and the administration was beginning to feel it.

It seemed as if we were winning but, just then, at the apex of the campaign, a grave error was committed by the leadership of the Nurses and Hospital Workers League. The representative of the Section did not object to this decision. A truce was accepted by the League and for a week the whole campaign came to a standstill. This, and the fact that the Section failed to mobilize its members for an effective picket line, served as a blow to the whole struggle. The sentiment for the reinstatement of the two nurses subsided, picketing became lax, and the two nurses remained jobless.

However, picketing and the distribution of leaflets radicalized the workers in the hospital considerably. When, later on, a maintenance worker was discharged, he was promptly taken back as a result of immediate action on the part of a committee of workers demanding his reinstatement. In another case, a food worker was reinstated because a petition signed by over 60 workers was sent in to the administration. In both cases, the nucleus was in the leadership. The workers gained confidence in the Communist Party. They would discuss their grievances with our comrades. We realized the importance of organizing them immediately into a shop group.

Another Section Rep. was assigned to our unit and he helped us in our work, but he, too, had to leave soon because of another assignment. The Shop Council, however, remained intact and became a part of the Nurses and Hospital Workers League. More and more workers signed up

with the Council and at present it has over 75 members. At the same time, the nucleus kept on recruiting new members, and again we turned to the Section for aid.

This time they sent us a comrade who "comes straight from the bench". He is capable, he has had trade union experience, and does not act like a governess. On the contrary, he arouses comrades' initiative and is respected and liked by everybody.

Our nucleus has at present 18 members. We have no fluctuation due to the interesting inner life of the unit. We carry on discussions at every unit meeting linking up the general struggle of the working class with the life and work in the shop. The work of the unit is well planned and every member is activated. The attitude of the comrades towards one another is friendly and comradely and everybody is enthused.

Distribution of leaflets and our monthly shop paper is done inside by our own comrades; thus we learn illegal methods. Our first leaflet was distributed in front of the hospital by the concentration unit, but after the administration claimed that the leaflet was issued by the "outside disturbers", we decided to distribute most of our literature inside the shop. This is done in an efficient way: at a definite time, the distribution is done throughout the hospital. The Party is very much respected among the workers. The closest and the most trustworthy of our contacts are involved in Party work and this makes them feel very much honored. It makes it much easier for us to recruit them into the Party.

At present, we have 18 members in the Party nucleus and 20 contacts. We are also on the road to organizing a Y.C.L. unit. Although we have already doubled our membership since the recruiting drive for new members began, by the end of the drive we expect to triple it.

"The Party is the class conscious, advanced section of the class, its vanguard. The power of this vanguard is ten, a hundred and more times as great as its numbers.

"Is this possible? Is it possible for hundreds to excell the force of thousands? It is possible and it does so when the hundreds are organized.

"Organization strengthens the forces tenfold...

"More and more forces of the proletariat are awakening to social and political activity. IT IS NECESSARY PATIENTLY TO EXPLAIN TO THEM THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE PARTY, TO PROVE TO THEM THE NECESSITY OF JOINING THE PARTY."

—Lenin.

AGITPROP SECTION

The "Shop Paper Editor"

By JOE LESLIE

Shop Papers—A Mass Agitational Weapon

IN the period of sharp struggles that the working class is approaching, the work of the units, particularly of the shop units, will be decisive. To the extent that we give guidance and leadership to the units in their daily activity, to that extent will we insure the development and growth of our Party. In this period, when the Party must prepare itself to face conditions of terror, such methods of reaching the masses as the shop paper and leaflet stand out as among the most important. For example, when we consider that the combined circulation of the shop papers in one District alone (New York), exceeds the circulation of the **Daily Worker** nationally by more than 10,000 copies, and that these shop papers reach the workers in the factories in basic industry, where few of our other publications reach them, we realize what a powerful instrument of mass agitation our shop papers are.

The Cleveland District of our Party must receive high praise, therefore, for undertaking, in a serious manner, the organization of its shop paper work. In August of last year the Shop Paper Department of Cleveland began to issue an inner Party publication, the **Shop Paper Editor**, to give guidance and leadership to the existing shop papers, and to help establish new papers in the shops where they as yet do not exist. The **Shop Paper Editor** answers a much felt need. The continued publication of this monthly bulletin, combined with an even more intensive personal guidance to the most important units issuing shop papers, will, no doubt, insure real progress in the life of the units and in the quality of the shop papers they issue.

Irregularity—A Wide-Spread Weakness

Each month the **Shop Paper Editor** has become increasingly better, and this is a healthy sign, indicating that we may expect further improvement. Most of the splendid features of the original issues are retained in the later ones. Among them are the vital statistics that are the barometer of the activity of the units—the quota of shop papers in

the District for the month, the number actually issued, the number of first issues and the number that failed to appear. Carrying these figures on the first page, the **Shop Paper Editor** brings sharply to the fore one of the most significant weaknesses of our shop paper work—irregularity. There are very few factory papers in the entire country that can boast of having appeared twelve times during the last year. Of the quota of 48 papers set by the Cleveland District for itself for a period of three months, only 16 appeared. That is, the average was five out of 16 for each month. The comrades are very conscious of this major weakness and in the November issue of the **Shop Paper Editor** they analyze the causes for it. What are these causes?

“There are at least seven. First the lack of political leadership. Here an editor must be trained to realize the political responsibility of getting the shop paper out regularly and the Sections must see to it that this is done. Second, the loose functioning of the units. Third, the lack of an organized and determined drive to get finances for the shop paper. Fourth, the shutdowns of the factories. Fifth, the lack of contact of the outlying section with the district. Sixth, the lack of a typewriter, mimeograph, etc. Seventh, the lack of a technical staff around each unit.”

Need To Work Out Organizational Steps For Overcoming Weaknesses

This self-criticism is good. But self-criticism in itself is insufficient. It is necessary to take steps to overcome the defects of the units. To the degree that the leading comrades from the District and the Sections will give attention to the most important of these nuclei, to that degree will we succeed in strengthening the work of the nuclei as a whole. Future issues of the **Shop Paper Editor** should contain material dealing with the methods of overcoming the weaknesses in the shop paper work, a series of short articles, for example, on how a shop unit functions, on ways of raising money, on how to organize technical help, etc., or, better still, articles to popularize the methods used by a particular unit in overcoming its weaknesses.

Good Technical Help

The strongest feature of the **Shop Paper Editor**, at present, is the specific technical help that it gives. First in importance is a number of timely cartoons that can easily be reproduced in the various shop papers. Second are a number of direct technical hints for mimeographing, such as appear in the September issue, as:

Box in your titles;

Break up the columns with subtitles;

Cartoons should be used as much as possible, etc.

Each issue of the paper contains an article on an important, timely, political question, such as the elections, the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Communist Party and the like. These articles are to serve as models and the comrades are advised to reprint them in their own shop papers, adapting them to the conditions of their own shop. Although written in a language somewhat simpler, and perhaps more suited to shop paper use than the articles in the Party press on the same topics, one feels, however, that a real danger arises here, that of drawing the papers away from the shop. With a busy shop paper editor, the temptation would be great to lift out the District model bodily, and reprint it in the local factory paper, without saying very much on the shop. A good shop paper should grow out of the life of the shop, should be an integral part of the experiences of the workers in the factories in which the shop papers appear.

It is a very good plan to call to the attention of the comrades the most important political questions facing the Party nationally, such as the elections. But there are perhaps other and better ways of introducing these questions to the shop papers than by writing the article for them. We might suggest that the comrades instead of publishing a model article written in the District, try to publish a good article that has already appeared in a shop paper on such a topic.

In addition to articles reprinted from shop papers, there might be included an outline of the main points the article is to deal with, (such as Comrade Wrough's in the October issue) a list of easily available references where the comrades could find material on the particular question, and suggestions on how to introduce these problems, **primarily as problems facing the workers in each particular shop.**

Criticism Must Be Well Thought Out

Another feature of this bulletin are regular reviews of factory papers appearing in the Cleveland District. These reviews, although in the main very good, suffer, however, from being too brief. Brevity is not always a virtue. For one who has not seen the paper under consideration in the review, no picture is presented of the particular paper. The criticisms are also more general than specific, except when they deal with technical matters. It might be better perhaps, instead of reviewing two or three papers in one issue of the **Shop Paper Editor**, to review only one, but do it more thoroughly.

It would also not be amiss to keep in mind that, from time to time, reviews of the more important papers should be forwarded to the **Daily Worker** (with a few notes about the shop, trade union conditions existing there, etc.) for reprinting nationally, so that the entire Party might benefit both from the review and from the experiences gained from giving attention to such important shops as Fisher Body, Goodrich Rubber, New York Central Railroad.

Also the type of review in the **Shop Paper Editor** might be varied for the sake of interest and greater political clarity. It is not always necessary to review an entire paper but a single article of importance might be subjected to real analysis, or, on the other hand, all the papers in the District might be reviewed at once to see how they carried on a particular struggle, such as the united front, or the struggle against fascism and the war danger.

One fine feature of the **Shop Paper Editor** is the story on the Fisher Body unit which draws lessons for the Party on the nine years of life of the unit. It tells of the inactivity of the unit, that led to a condition so that when the comrades issued a shop paper, the **Spark Plug**, the unit turned into a shop paper editorial board. Instead of the shop paper becoming a tool, an instrument of struggle, it became a stopping point in the class battle. Thus neither our comrades nor the shop paper fulfilled their role correctly. What little activity our comrades were carrying out declined, and since they weren't leading the workers in their struggles, the shop paper could not become the voice of those struggles. This disease can easily creep into a unit that is not carrying on struggle, thereby becoming isolated from the masses of workers.

Shop Paper Bound Up With The Life Of The Unit

But what is significant for us here is that the problems of the shop paper are shown to be inextricably bound up with the life and the organizational status of the unit itself. And for this reason it is fitting that the **Shop Paper Editor** concern itself with the Cleveland shop nuclei conference, as it does in the November issue. In this manner the **Shop Paper Editor** serves not only as a medium for the exchange of experiences in shop paper work, but performs a broader function, that of serving as a medium for the exchange of experiences in shop nuclei work as a whole.

In conclusion, we may say that the need for such a publication as the **Shop Paper Editor**, exists not only in Cleveland. Where a District Shop Paper Committee exists, it should undertake to emulate the splendid beginning made by the Cleveland comrades. No doubt, there are some Districts in which shop paper committees do not as yet exist. In

these places we have a double problem: that of establishing such a committee and of developing a shop paper bulletin. For Cleveland, we can say that if the organization of the shop paper work develops with the same thoughtfulness with which it began, we can expect to see developed in this District shop papers that should serve as models for the rest of our Party.

Educational Work in the Factories

By Sec. Org., Hudson County, N. J.

“WHAT? A study group in a shop as an initial step in shop work?” inquired a member of our District, when informed that we have organized a shop nucleus on the basis of a study group and are about to organize another. “Why don’t you organize them first into the union?” was his second question. We will herein prove that there is no hard and fast rule as to what must be organized “first”, and that classes and study groups can actually be utilized to make contact with workers in shops and recruit them.

In shop X, a steel mill, a strike took place over a year ago. The workers struck for a number of weeks, won a partial victory, returned to work. The boss then applied all the forces at his command and defeated the workers. The shop remained open. A struggle was led, the workers were on the move, at that time. Now there is no movement whatever in the shop.

In shop Z, a potential war factory, the A. F. of L. started a campaign for a union before the N.R.A. A number of workers were fired for union activity, bosses’ spies swarmed the union meetings, this was not counteracted by the union. The boss initiated a company union and it swept through the shop. Here as well no form of workers’ organization exists within the shop.

It is necessary to ask the question: Why is it that struggles take place, yet when they pass there is often no real foundation for revolutionary work laid in the shop to lead the workers, to be the source of revolutionary influence and ideology? The answer lies in the fact that when we lead struggles we take no definite, conscious steps to develop and educate the workers ideologically. This explains why many workers do not join the Party. We very often forget and very seldom apply the theoretical side of the class struggle.

Yet, we must fight to win over the workers to a proletarian ideology, to Communism, by raising the level of the

fight for bread. How then should the workers see the line of demarcation between the Communists and the reformists? But once we arm the workers with revolutionary theory and will pay steady attention to the theoretical development of the workers we are organizing, then we'll not only write and speak about "facing" the shops,—but we will transform them into our "fortresses".

Here are our experiences in shops X and Z.

We were informed that a group of workers having absolutely no sympathy for our movement in shop Z wanted to study English. We organized an elementary class in Political Economy, combining it with the teaching of English. The result of this group today is a shop nucleus. The workers joined the Party on one condition, that the class will not be disbanded. And it is not!

In shop X, when visiting contacts for the study group, we often heard similar arguments: "The workers wouldn't stick together". ("If only they would", our good contact would remark) "everyone is for himself, many stick to the foreman, you cannot do anything in our shop."

However, these workers were convinced by the argument that it is necessary to develop a group of workers in the shop, to inspire them with class consciousness, with the necessary understanding of the revolutionary movement. While laying such a foundation, we, to say the least, have a guarantee that when struggles will be developed in this shop the necessary leadership is being forged to head them.

The majority of the workers we visited gladly agreed to join a study group. We are about to start one in shop X, a much larger one than in Z, since we are utilizing all the contacts we know, choosing the best.

This is the method with which we are laying the foundation for a Workers' School in our Section: on the basis of shops, within trade unions, and mass organizations. We therefore recommend our experiences to Party functionaries, especially to agitprops, as part of our work to build the Party—to organize shop study groups.

How Our Unit Linked Up the Various Campaigns and Recruited Twelve Seamen

By Esther Carroll

UNIT 7, Section 7, operates in the Red Hook territory of Brooklyn. During the seamen's strike the unit directed its forces toward the strike, with particular attention paid towards the colonial seamen, as our unit has the task of building the Filipino and Porto Rican Anti-Imperialist League. Our election campaign open-air meetings, too, were held close to the seamen's home and the strike headquarters.

During this period the unit also took up the important Party campaigns, such as the Fifteenth Anniversary, election campaign, **Daily Worker** and recruiting. To link these problems up, the unit decided to hold a house party to which some of the seamen would be invited, at which also we were to raise money for the **Daily Worker**. To make sure that the party will be within the reach of the seamen we arranged it in the poorly furnished house of a comrade right near the seamen's headquarters. We decorated the house, hung up appropriate pictures and slogans.

A committee of comrades active among the strikers invited those whom we wanted to approach on joining the Party. These seamen, about twenty, came down in their blue sweatshirts and in overalls. The comrades made them feel at home in no time. The words of our revolutionary songs were taught to them and soon they were drawn into collective singing, dancing, and games. The chairman, too, was not appointed, but elected from the crowd, and sure enough a seaman who was a favorite of the strikers was elected.

The chairman called on people to make impromptu talks. The strike was brought forth. The role of the **Daily** in this and other strikes was brought out. The Fifteenth Anniversary was linked with joining the Party, for which an appeal was made. An appeal was also made for **Daily Worker** funds. Fifteen dollars was collected for the **Daily**. Twelve seamen joined the Party. An invitation was extended for all who wish to come to the Party unit meeting. This social affair showed these workers that there is no discrimination in the ranks of the Communist Party.

The meeting at which these new members were introduced was full of enthusiasm. It made the hearts of all our comrades swell with joy. The proceedings of this meeting were all translated from English into Spanish and vice

versa. In their acceptance talks the new comrades expressed important ideas and I would like to quote some of them.

A Spanish seaman talks; his black eyes burning: "I'm twenty-eight years old. I'm an able-bodied seaman. Abuse and discrimination is all I met on my job. I want to be united with all fellow workers who suffer just like me. Through the Communist Party I can achieve it. I will be a member straight, and always."

A Filipino: "I came to help in the strike and saw that the Communists are the most active, most organizational and devoted people. I'm glad to be admitted in the Communist Party."

An Irish seaman: "You guys are pretty lucky. So young and walking right into the Party, just like this. I gave fifteen years to the I.W.W., International Seamen's Union, never was I explained of the importance of a political party. In the last strike led by the M.W.I.U. I learned that the workers need not only a union but also a political party. I wanted to join the political Party of the workers, therefore I joined the Communist Party."

A young Filipino seaman: "I want that the shipowners, bosses and police could not suppress us forever and ever. On my trips I heard talk that there, in Russia, all working people of all races and nationalities are treated equally. I want to belong to the Communist Party, so that I can learn about the movement, so that when I get back to my country I can apply it to help my people to get freedom and independence."

The unit organizer, a young Porto Rican fellow, greeted these new members into the ranks of the Party, and brought himself as an example to whom the Party was a school—something that saved him from degeneration and despair.

All assignments that evening went off very quickly. We had plenty of forces to carry out all assignments. We were all very enthusiastic and felt stronger than ever before. "We will build a seamen's local in Brooklyn", the comrades said.

We "linked" up our campaigns and succeeded. Now our big task is to help these new members, to work with them collectively, to educate them, to keep these splendid new elements in the ranks of our Party.
